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THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENT INTEREST

SOME years ago it was the pleasure of the writer to hear from the lips of one of the most distinguished Tammany district leaders a public defence of his *alma mater*. "Tammany Hall," said this patriot, "is a benevolent institution; Tammany Hall is a patriotic institution; Tammany Hall is a philanthropic institution; Tammany Hall has the honor of being the first to propose that immortal Monroe doctrine which blesses and revivifies the world." This remarkable statement suggests widespread popular interest in a doctrine the scope of which appears to be very different in different minds. To the statesman, the editor, the orator, and the writer of magazine articles, the phrase "Monroe doctrine" appears often very like "that blessed word, Mesopotamia," which so comforted and invigorated the poor old mother in Israel; it is a cult rather than a clearly defined principle.

Out of the many senses in which this perhaps overworked phrase has been used, four may be selected as the most important and most widely known. The first of these is the original principle as stated by President Monroe in 1823. The second is Polk's averment from 1845 to 1849—that it is the duty of the United States to annex American territory lest it be annexed by European countries. The third doctrine, stated by Secretary Blaine in 1881, holds that the United States is sole guardian of the transit across the American isthmus, and the arbiter of disputes between Latin-American powers. The fourth doctrine, formulated by Secretary Olney in 1895, is that the United States is sovereign in America, that the British colonies in America are temporary, and that these declarations are a part of international law.

Plainly all these various principles of international policy cannot be one and the same doctrine. Without criticising later American statesmen for looking at things differently from President Monroe, and without overlooking the truth that this nation has an interest in American affairs beyond that of any other power, it is time to inquire what policy in American relation is best and likeliest to advance our permanent national interest; and to ask whether it is longer necessary to express the aspirations of the United States

in a worn-out formula which no longer has a fixed and vital meaning in our minds. Surely it is one of the humors of history that an envoy whose diplomacy was discredited by both Washington and Jefferson, a President who did not invent his own doctrine, should go down to posterity as a political seer who could frame a controlling principle of guidance in international affairs, still to have unabated force eighty years after the crisis which called it forth.

Not much space need be expended on an account of the origin of the Monroe doctrine. All the world knows that in 1823 there existed in Central and South America a group of about a dozen Latin-American states, recently revolted, practically independent, inasmuch as the mother country could not subdue them, some of them already recognized by the United States as independent nations, yet obstinately claimed by Spain as still her possessions. Upon the other side of the water there was between the great European powers an understanding, the purpose of which was to keep the peace of Europe—a system commonly called the Holy Alliance. This organization has perhaps been maligned; it is almost identical with the present European “concert of powers,” and, like its modern sister, was meant to keep order and to save life, though it often dealt selfishly and cruelly with local insurrections, lest they might grow to great convulsions. In 1823 Spain was restored to its tyrant by a French army acting for united Europe, and the tyrant naturally appealed to his sponsors to extinguish the flame of rebellion across the ocean. The project meant the closing of the recently opened Latin-American markets to the general commerce of the world; and Great Britain, who had both commercial and political reasons for standing in the way, gave warning to the United States, and even offered to join in a declaration against European intervention in America. At the same time, though from independent reasons, Russia made claim to the whole northwestern coast of America, as a country never occupied by a civilized nation, and thus set herself counter to the broad-minded project of a Pacific colony, which had for twenty years been dear to Jefferson.

No one who knows the cautious and somewhat sluggish mind of Monroe could suppose *a priori* that he had the genius to meet and counteract the double danger; the real author and probable penman of the famous declaration of 1823 was John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State. He had already rapped the knuckles of the Russian ambassador on the Oregon question, and he threw all his immense energy into the task of nerving up the President to a strong announcement. The result was the annual message of December 2, 1823, embodying what was thereafter called “The

Monroe doctrine," the essentials of which are three statements. The first, which immediately follows a discussion of the Russian claims to Oregon, and is quite separate in the context from the part of the message relative to Latin-America, is the statement that "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." The second point is that of intervention in the new Spanish-American states; the most significant phrase is, "We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other way than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The third point relates to the system of European alliance to prevent revolts: "It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness."

These three positive declarations are in every case offset, or conditioned, by negative statements. In the first place, Monroe expressly disavowed hostility to the possessions of foreign powers in Canada, Alaska, and the West Indies, in the words: "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere." In the second place, he disavowed any hegemony of the United States among the American powers: "In their career we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves the government which in their judgment may suit them best." In the third place, he expressly based his right to protest against European intervention on our withdrawal from European interests: "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage in the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers."

It will be seen that the Monroe doctrine was not intended by Monroe to be a code of international law, but was called out by a special set of circumstances long since outgrown—aggressions by Russia and by allied Europe. So far as it referred to the future, the doctrine was intended to state a kind of *quid pro quo*; this is sufficiently plain from Jefferson's oft-quoted letter of advice to Monroe: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to meddle with cisatlantic affairs."

Much trouble and confusion might have been saved had Monroe and Adams taken out a copyright upon the term "Monroe

doctrine," and so distinctly confined the term to the state policy that they had in mind. When Polk became President in 1845 the Oregon question had revived in a new form, and in his first annual message he deemed it "A proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe"; but he added a statement, nowhere implied in the original doctrine: "It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion should, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent." Yet even Polk based the right to oppose European colonies, though planted with approval of other American powers, upon the non-interference of America in Europe.

Notwithstanding this bold announcement, the President, a few months later, gave up his principle of colonization by accepting a part of the Oregon territory, and showed his friendship to Latin-America by making war on Mexico. In 1848 Polk wanted to annex Yucatan; and he found his authority in the other and long-neglected branch of the Monroe doctrine; annexation, he said, would prevent the Yucatanese from offering themselves as a colony to some European power, and thus introducing the "political system" of Europe. Whether or not this reasoning was sound, it certainly was not Monroe's.

About the same time American foreign policy was brought to a point on the question of an isthmus canal. Polk was not an anti-expansionist; in fact, his foreign policy might justify him in appropriating the Dey of Algiers's compliment to the Duke of Kent: "Your father, the King of England, is the greatest pirate in the world; and I am second to him." There is, therefore, something droll in the charge of a recent writer that, "Polk lost his signal opportunity for asserting the Monroe doctrine in the face of actual British aggression on the Isthmus." Possibly Polk thought he had already stretched the doctrine as far as it would go.

The next opportunity for the application of the Monroe doctrine was the French conquest of Mexico from 1861 to 1867. Nobody can accuse Secretary Seward of lack of national feeling or diplomatic finesse or quickness in seizing on precedents; and his most recent biographer with justice considers his Mexican policy "his most perfect achievement in diplomacy." Here was the case of a foreign government deliberately overthrowing a neighboring republic and planting a monarchy upon its ruins; one would expect to find Seward's dispatches punctuated with "colonization," "political system," and "interposition." It is a remarkable fact that he nowhere used the words "Monroe doctrine," nor referred to prece-

dents. He declared at the beginning that it was the policy of the United States "to leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own people"; and although he advanced in 1867 to the point of a decided threat of war unless the French withdrew, he based his whole policy upon the general doctrine of the right of American peoples to form their own governments, and upon the hostility to the United States shown by France in attempting to establish a despotic foreign government upon our borders. Seward felt strong enough to form a policy of his own without adopting the orphaned Monroe doctrine.

Nevertheless, in the public press and in Congress the words had been heard often enough, and a hostility to English possessions began to appear, expressed in the protest of the House of Representatives in 1867 against the formation of a Canadian federation. President Grant asserted in 1870 that "the time is not so far distant when, in the natural course of events, the European political connection with this continent will cease." The controversy with England came to a head upon the proposed European guarantee of neutrality for the French Panama canal. Mr. Blaine, in 1881, laid down in a general circular a new doctrine of his own, declaring "that European aggression would partake of the nature of an alliance against the United States." But he too, like Polk and Seward, thought the paramount interest of the United States a sufficient ground for objection; and he did not shield himself under Monroe's authority. He had, moreover, a broad scheme of establishing a benevolent leadership among the American states with their own consent, a project partially realized in the inter-American conference of 1889.

The farthest extension of policy to which the name "Monroe doctrine" has ever been seriously applied appears in the explosive despatches of Secretary Olney in 1895, and President Cleveland's special message of December 17, 1895, invoking the Monroe doctrine to prevent the occupation of territory disputed between a British colony and a Latin-American state; again, however, this position was expressly based upon "American non-interference in European affairs." No previous President or Secretary of State had ever taken the broad and sweeping ground now assumed by Secretary Olney; he declared "any permanent political union between a European and an American state was unnatural and inexpedient"; that the interests "of Europe are irreconcilably diverse from those of America"; that "to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition"; that it is "master of the situation."

These weighty declarations were further asserted to be at once a reassertion of Monroe's doctrine, and a permanent principle of international law for American relations. Whether sound or otherwise, they have so little relation to the doctrine of 1823 that one is tempted to apply to Secretary Olney's argument the Oxford undergraduate's account of a football game: "It would have been just as good a fight without the ball; the ball was only in the way." It is difficult to resist the conviction that Olney's doctrine would have had more force if it had stood boldly on a principle of permanent national interest. Monroe added no strength to his position.

Jefferson had a theory that no people has a legal right to incur a national debt to be paid by the next generation; perhaps it might be fair to ask that no generation shall lay down a principle of international policy which later generations must be compelled to twist to every new exigency. The various glosses on the original message show clearly the difficulty of adjusting the original Monroe doctrine to the conditions of to-day; indeed, the whole face of America has so changed in seventy-seven years that new principles are absolutely necessary. In the first place, since 1823, Spain has been eliminated as a factor in American affairs, by the long-maintained independence of the Spanish-American states, and very recently by the conquest of Cuba and Porto Rico. At the same time France—in 1823 and again in 1861 a source of real danger—has ceased to be effective in American relations; hence there can never be any shadow of intervention for the sake of restoring Spanish dominion. On the other hand, Monroe's hopefulness that the Latin-American powers would show those qualities of steadfastness, order, and peaceful obedience to the law of the majority which characterize real republican government has been unhappily dispelled; there is not a single Latin-American power, except Mexico, which has succeeded in keeping internal peace, or which could defend its own soil against a foreign army. At the same time the fear that republican government might be extinguished in the United States by what Clay called "the giddiness and intoxication of power" of European monarchy, has forever been dispelled.

The territorial relations of Great Britain and the United States have also undergone a great change; while the British West Indies have diminished in importance and the little colonies of Guiana, Honduras, and Belize are still feeble and thinly populated, Canada has stretched across the continent step by step along with the United States, and is now more strongly attached to England by sentiment and commercial ties than at any time for half a century. The spread

of the power of the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific involves the country in new relations with the western states of South and Central America, and lends a powerful impetus to the movement for an interoceanic canal, now the great storm center in American affairs. If there is need for any set doctrine, the Monroe doctrine is too weak for the circumstances of this day, when the United States has become the greatest Caribbean power, the power most concerned in a highway across the narrow lands from ocean to ocean, and the power which has contact with British territory along a land frontier of four thousand miles.

A glance at a map or the turning a page of statistics will show that the only foreign nation which has a vital interest or influence within the Americas is Great Britain. There are Germans in Brazil, Italians in the Argentine, French capital on the Isthmus of Panama, Spanish-speaking people in Cuba and Porto Rico; but Germany, France, Italy, and Spain are not factors in American questions, and can never become such. Since the withdrawal of the French from Mexico in 1867, all the extreme forms of the so-called Monroe doctrine are therefore in essence assertions that to the United States belongs a place in American affairs which will not brook any sharing of responsibilities or power with great Britain.

The changes in American conditions are hardly greater than those in our relations with Europe. When Secretary Olney reiterated that the United States had no share in European complications, he did not expect that four years later the United States would arouse the jealousy of Europe by insisting that Turkey pay a bill for damages at the point of a despatch; or that the United States would lay down a Chinese policy for Europe to follow. In two senses the "political system" which aroused Monroe's suspicions has disappeared. Western Europe is democratic, and a combination of real or unreal sovereigns to prevent the spread of liberal thought has ceased to be possible. In 1823 every country in Europe except Switzerland was monarchic; hence there was an antagonism and a contrast between the American republic and Europe which all the world observed. To-day not only is Switzerland broadly and genuinely a republic, under a government closely modelled on the United States; France is a republic; the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Holland, Austro-Hungary, Italy, and Germany, are to a large extent democratic; England, under the forms of monarchy, has a government the most closely responsive to public opinion known to mankind. Europe and the European political system are no longer bugbears; and we now study foreign political systems in the expectation of finding something that will be useful to us.

Commercial relations with Europe are also much more intimate and important than they were in 1823 ; a single ocean steamship in a year will carry a fifteenth as much as the whole foreign commerce of the United States in 1823. Within the borders of the United States live eight million persons born in European countries ; a hundred thousand Americans annually visit the Eastern hemisphere. Missionaries and commercial travellers, the two advance agents of civilization, are found in every European country, and American oil, food products, and manufactures spread throughout the world. When the American tariff draws its cabalistic circle of exclusion, the tin-miner of Cornwall, the button-maker of Vienna, the potter of Limoges, and the weaver of Saxony become aware of the weight of our government. Let any one examine the useful government publication known as *Foreign Relations* during the last twenty years, and one will be amazed at the amount and multifariousness of present American interests in European countries.

To maintain the aloofness which was the condition of the original Monroe doctrine has become, therefore, simply impossible. When the German agrarians and socialists get into a scrimmage in the Reichstag we are interested, for the question is the exclusion of our food exports ; when the British Parliament discusses a bill for creating an Australian federation, we are interested, for it means a tariff in New South Wales ; when Li Hung Chang exhibits his certificates of good character, while Chinese irregular troops are burning Protestant churches, we are interested, because those churches were built by American contributions. France cannot even hold a world's fair without a reasonable assurance that the Americans will be present with some of the products of the Leadville mines in their pockets.

After all, these commercial and personal matters are not the influences which most powerfully and inevitably draw the United States into European relations. The process of aggregation which is so visible in corporations, companies, and trusts is equally visible in the political world. In 1802 there were about one hundred German states ; now there are but twenty-seven, and these are united in one federation. Who does not see that within the last thirty years the number of possible world powers has been steadily drawing down ? In all Europe and Asia there are now but four nations which will indubitably be great powers a century hence—Russia, Germany, Great Britain and China. In the Pacific, Japan is the only permanent world power ; in the western world there is but one great nation, the United States. These six powers must inevitably control the destinies of mankind ; the history of the future is the history of the relations, friendly or otherwise, between them ;

the diplomacy of the future is the grouping and regrouping of these six units with or against each other. Where the ruling powers are so few, how can it be supposed that the United States will be willing to stand aloof from the European controversies which involve the destinies of the world, or that it could stand aloof if it so desired? For good or evil, the United States has taken upon itself a share in the world's affairs and cannot abdicate its responsibilities. There is no such thing for us as a quiet home-dwelling under our vine and fig tree ; there is for us no Chinese wall against trade or intercourse or political influences.

What is true of Europe is even more true of the East. The United States has a chain of possessions from the Pacific coast to the Asiatic through Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. It thus becomes neighbor to Japan, to China, to French, English, and Dutch Asiatic colonies, to New Zealand, to the flourishing new commonwealth of Australia ; and this propinquity involves questions of trade, of outlet for our manufactures, of travel, of sojourn, of colonial administration. All these questions ultimately lead back to Europe, because the Asiatic questions of the future, except for the influence of Japan, must be settled in the council rooms of the western world ; and the future of China, the fate of Persia, the status of the Pacific islands, are questions which are incapable of permanent solution unless the United States is a party to that solution. Indeed, Wu Ting Fang, Chinese minister, has recently quizzically suggested that, " The Monroe doctrine being the fixed policy of your government, the natural logic is that it should be applied to that part of the world where this country has possessions."

There are people who suppose that it was possible to avoid all these responsibilities by abstaining from the recent conquests in the West Indies or East Indies ; but, without a Spanish War, had there never been a Cuba, were the Hawaiian Islands to have sunk beneath the ocean, the eventual participation of America in the world's affairs was as inevitable as the flow of lava down the slope of a volcano. There has never been known to man an aggregation of political and social strength comparable with the United States, which did not make itself a factor in the world's history. Our diplomacy has sometimes been crude, uninformed, and disregardful of its own precedents ; but it has expressed a national intention to speak in the councils of nations. The assurance of the physical power of the nation, its ability to make itself felt, the clearness to see national interests in an exaggerated form, have not arisen out of the Spanish War ; they come from the natural eagerness of an energetic people, which has perhaps too much confidence in its

own good judgment, and is quicker to see disorder in other lands than at home; but which feels itself what it really is—a living force in the affairs of mankind.

If American diplomats have henceforth to formulate and defend the American policy of their country, they must do so within the conditions which have been described above. In the first place, they cannot fail to recognize, as they have long recognized, the defects in Latin-American government; Cuba was no worse misgoverned by Spain than Venezuela is by its own people. The history of our relations with our neighbor republics is one of constant irritation on one side, and, in general, of great forbearance on the other; without power to maintain order or to protect their own citizens, the Latin-American governments have been unable, and sometimes unwilling, to prevent the seizure of the property of foreigners, or to avoid acts of personal violence. The phrase which most frequently occurs in the diplomatic correspondence with America is not “Monroe doctrine,” but “unpaid claims.”

If we expect to exert influence over these countries, we must also take into account their prejudices and their pride. Peru was very glad to have the United States remonstrate against its implacable Chilean conquerors in 1881; Venezuela joyfully accepted the intervention of the United States in the boundary controversy of 1895; but Peruvians and Venezuelans would probably join in resistance to any attempt on our part to set up or support a government for them, however better than their own. Mexico is the great exception to this principle, because in Mexico American capitalists practically dictate the protection of their own property. But if the United States should stand forth as the protector of individual Latin-American states against each other, or in their frequent and unavoidable quarrels with European powers, it would assume also a responsibility which our American neighbors would infallibly resent whenever exercised against their preferences.

In the next place, the existence of small French and Dutch island colonies in the Caribbean, and of larger and more important British islands and continental areas, must be accepted as a fact; and there seems no likelihood of the extinction of the French or English title by any process short of a successful war of conquest.

A permanent and growing interest in what have hitherto seemed strictly European questions must also be taken into account by our statesmen. It seems probable that a second Cretan insurrection or Armenian massacre or subjugation of Hungary would lead to protests more vigorous than the United States has ever yet uttered on European affairs; and the transatlantic war of tariffs must some-

time have an end either by lowering of the bars at both ends, or by hostile and irritating retaliatory legislation. In the Pacific and in eastern Asia the nation appears to have a footing which it is not disposed to give up. Plainly it is idle to base the foreign policy of the United States longer on the principle that we stand entirely separate from the quarrels or the diplomatic arrangements of the Eastern hemisphere.

The extension of the term "Monroe doctrine" from the limited form given it by John Quincy Adams to that stated by Secretary Olney has of course a reason: there is an apparent advantage, when the United States takes up a position in American diplomacy, in bringing it within the Monroe doctrine; because it may then be urged that foreign powers which ignore or question our positions have had many decades of notice, and hence are sinning against light. But it is impossible to appeal to a part of the principle and to ignore the rest; and the history of the doctrine shows absolutely that down to 1895 the United States always asserted a special American influence, on the ground that it left to European powers a similar special interest in Europe. This is simply a doctrine of the permanent subdivision of the earth into two spheres of influence, each of which could get on without the other, and in each of which the interference of the other would be unwarranted. There was really no such separation in 1823, and every year draws the ends of the earth closer together. To claim the Monroe doctrine as still our guiding principle is to suggest to other nations that the United States has no power outside America. The two areas are not separate and never can be separated; the United States is a world power, and cannot claim the special privileges of a diplomatic recluse, and at the same time the mastery of the western hemisphere.

That the interests of European powers in America are in general not equal to those of the United States is as true as that the United States can and will keep out of most European imbroglios. It was not by accident that Seward in 1867 based his protest against the final conquest of Mexico upon a broad basis of permanent national interest: that has really been the ground for each of the Protean forms of statement which have been discussed above. Adams, Polk, Fish, Blaine, Olney, Hay, all have had in their minds the conception that international relations depend as much upon geography as upon international law, that propinquity of necessity creates questions which cannot be settled off-hand by diplomatic precedents. It is notorious that neighboring countries almost always have permanent grievances against each other; if Italy were across the channel from England, the two powers would constantly

be in hot water ; if Brazil were a German colony, there would be friction between the United States and Germany all the time. All that was valuable in Monroe's message was the assertion that the United States had such a commercial and political interest in this hemisphere that it would not permit European powers to alter the American status by force. Had Spain possessed the physical power to conquer the rebellious colonies, the United States would not have felt itself bound by Monroe's disclaimer, and eventually would have compelled Spain to give them up. If the United States had a commerce for which the Suez canal was indispensable, it would naturally take a great interest in the control of that canal ; but we do not need Monroe's leave for the assertion of such an interest.

Most people who talk about the Monroe doctrine mean nothing more than that there should be no change of status in America prejudicial to the United States, though public opinion varies from year to year as to what is prejudicial. In the fifties Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé were sure that emancipation of slaves in Cuba was prejudicial and must be prevented ; in 1867 the majority of the Representatives thought the formation of a Canadian confederacy prejudicial. In 1850 the neutrality of the isthmus canal was thought so important that we went into the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ; in 1881 Mr. Blaine ignored the treaty ; in 1900 Mr. Hay recognized its validity by negotiating for its abrogation.

Is it not possible to rise above temporary and fleeting issues to some understanding as to what the "permanent interest" of the United States demands ? To formulate a state paper expressing such a principle is the work of a statesman and not of an essayist, but some clear and definite bases may be laid down for any permanent policy in pan-American affairs.

The first is that the territory of the United States is not to be hemmed in and cut off from its natural outlets ; the annexation of Louisiana, of the Floridas, of Oregon, and of California, all resulted from this principle ; at present it is not necessary to appeal to it, because our territory is everywhere accessible. The one exception is the highway of the Great Lakes which has no natural route to the sea ; but it is easier to make a safe commercial connection through the Mohawk Valley than through the lower St. Lawrence, and we do not need Quebec while we have New York. The only two strategic points which seemed threatening a few years ago have now come into our possession by the control of Cuba and the annexation of Hawaii. We are well protected.

The next principle is that the commerce of the United States with its American neighbors must not be shackled by any restric-

tions emanating from Europe. We reserve the right to cut off our own trade, and the failure of several successive series of reciprocity treaties in the last twenty-five years seems to show that Congress does not wish to extend our commerce in America at present ; but we do insist that no obstacle shall grow up to prevent at least an equal opportunity in the commerce of the Latin-American states.

In the third place, we must accept the existence of a large territorial part of the British Empire in America, and so far forth must admit that Great Britain is an American power in the same sense that we are an Asiatic power. The annexation of Canada, which has been predicted by many keen-sighted men for a century and a quarter, now seems more distant than ever, because the Canadians are satisfied, and Great Britain desires that they should be satisfied. Next-door intimacy with Canada has always caused, and probably will continue to cause, friction and some heart-burning ; the Oregon question, the San Juan question, the Alaskan boundary question, navigation of the St. Lawrence, the northeastern fisheries, the Maine boundary, transit in bond, rivalries of transcontinental railroads, tariff warfare,—all these disagreeable disputes might have been avoided if Montgomery and Arnold had taken Quebec in 1775 ; but they might also have been avoided if Burgoyne had taken Albany two years later. In the balance of national forces it came out that both the United States and Great Britain retained great areas of North American territory. To deny the right of Great Britain to hold Canada and Jamaica is to deny the original Monroe doctrine, which distinctly disclaims any hostility to those existing colonies.

In the fourth place, we are facing the problem of a canal from ocean to ocean, in which the country most advantaged will be the United States ; whatever the likelihood that the trans-continental railroads would still compete against a water transportation through a locked canal, the necessity of piercing the isthmus is too plain to be disregarded. One cannot quarrel with the people of the United States for the intention of constructing such a canal, although it is a fair question for engineers, statesmen, and financiers whether the cheapest and best method is not the completion of the Panama route. But the canal is not simply a road from the Atlantic coast of the United States to the Pacific ; it is an international benefit which the United States has no right to take upon itself, except as the representative of civilized commerce. The oceans are the property of mankind, and if we try to shut up an artificial strait between them, we may some day find the Bosphorus closed to us.

The next principle must be that in American affairs, as in all affairs, the United States shall stand by its obligations. The Clay-

ton-Bulwer treaty was ratified because it was a fair settlement of a very dangerous question ; and we do not realize how many critical questions have been kept in abeyance by that treaty. The British government unnecessarily aroused the hostility of America by the insistence on territorial right through control of a puppet king of the Mosquito Indians ; but all other interference in the construction of the canal has been warded off ; and now that Great Britain gracefully consents to give up joint guaranty, it leaves a clear field for American ownership.

The next principle is that, if the United States is to retain its influence, *it must refrain from further annexation of Latin-American territory*. The first movement toward the annexation of any part of Nicaragua or of Central America will arouse the hostility of all the other American nations, and undo all the work of commercial conciliation. Neither the Monroe doctrine nor any other common-sense doctrine delivers our neighbors over to us for spoliation.

These are general principles upon which the "doctrine of permanent interest" must proceed, because they are right, just, and reasonable principles, but also because they lie in the nature of our international conditions. There is no longer the slightest danger of any European intervention in America ; the last suggestion of such a thing was Grant's proposed joint intervention in Cuba in 1875. There is no longer any danger of establishing new European colonies in America ; the Venezuelan incident, with all its unreason, revealed clearly to the rest of the world the temper of the United States on that point. There is no longer any danger of the introduction of European monarchies—and, in fact, no European monarch could teach anything about absolute government to a Latin-American dictator.

Finally, neither the Monroe doctrine nor any form of American doctrine means that the United States is to do whatever may seem good to it in America, or that its "permanent interest" involves a right to get away from inconvenient restrictions in the law of nations, as established by the practice of civilized peoples. We have too much at stake to raise unnecessary difficulties at home or abroad ; we have to deal with and consider Latin-Americans, British-Americans, and American-Americans ; we have to safeguard our interests in Europe, in the Pacific, and in Asia ; we have to take account of the influence which this nation seems destined to exert on mankind. If there is to be in the coming century a great battle of Armageddon—once more Europe against the Huns—we can no more help taking our part with the hosts of freedom than we can help educating our children, building our churches, or main-

taining the rights of the individual. There is no proper and permanent doctrine of foreign policy which does not recognize the United States as the great leader in all American affairs, and one of the great leaders in the affairs of mankind. There is no safe or permanent doctrine which does not recognize our sisterhood with other nations under international law. The "doctrine of permanent interest," therefore, is a doctrine of peace in America, international fellowship in the eastern hemisphere, and civilization everywhere.

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